The question at hand is located at the intersection of EU law and national constitutional law, and aims to answer the following problem: namely, how to mitigate 
Introduction
The dynamic process of constitutionalism in the European legal space features the increased recognition of several actors at the constitutional plane, including civil society, and autonomous regions. The position of regions vis-à-vis EU law is a well-known topic of scholarly debate, has been a subject of Treaty Reforms, and has challenged the Court of Justice on more than one occasion. The regional tax cases I are but one example where the need for effective and uniform implementation of EU law no longer buttresses a strategy of 'regional blindness' (Ipsen 1966: 256 entities with legislative powers -generic 'regions' henceforth -need to defend and maintain their autonomy; on the one hand in a supranational context without an adult voice for those regions, III and, on the other hand, versus a central government that is charged with primary -one is tempted to say 'sole' -responsibility under EU law. IV The latter may lack the domestic instruments and legitimacy to perform a supervisory role, triggering further problems. Thus in case C-358/03, the federal government of Austria did not dispute the infringement as such, but argued that a judgment from the ECJ is needed in order to enable a substitution to implement the directive in the obstructive region of
Article 260 TFEU
"Panta rhei" and the same goes for constitutional law. In an age of globalization and localism, the unitary nation state with a static conception of legal power no longer thrives.
Instead, competences migrate along a bi-dimensional axis: towards the EU level, and to regions, yielding a complex picture that illustrates the high coordination costs associated with multilevel governance (Piattoni 2010: 26) . The EU directive has long been one of the prime examples of the coordination and cooperation between different levels of government, primarily between the EU and the national Member-States. Institutionally, the EU was not conceived to incorporate regional and local concerns. However, this "regional blindness" is gradually declining, allowing for a direct role of regional actors on the EU stage. Moreover, due to the increased competences regions enjoy at the national level, their role in the implementation of EU law increases. X This important role brings about questions with regards to the legal mechanisms ensuring implementation and compliance.
XI
The EU directive is an important legislative instrument, but its transposition is no sinecure.
The following figures substantiate this, from which we infer a significant correlation between the extent of regionalization of a Member State and problems with the implementation of EU law. Despite a certain correlation between the extent of regionalization and the implementation record as witnessed by these infringement numbers, some divergences do exist. Spain and Belgium show roughly similar infringement data, but are of a very different tiered system. Before we can address this issue, we will set out the practice of art. 260 TFEU.
General application
The infringement proceedings under article 258 and 260 TFEU offer the Commission a powerful weapon to ensure full compliance with EU law. Originally devised as a weapon of last instance, only exceptionally to have recourse to, the infringement procedure has evolved into a normal, reasonably transparent and technical procedure (Prete & Smulders 2010: 60) .
Following the Lisbon reform, the Commission can now petition the Court, after a shortened administrative phase XX , for a financial penalty in case of non-compliance with a previous infringement declaration by the ECJ, or, in case of the non-communication of measures of transposition of directives -as respectively stated in article 260, para 2 and 3 TFEU. The general approach of the Commission to these financial sanctions has been set
The case law diverges to some extent from these guidelines. XXXII The next section will aggregate the recent decisions.
Case law
The ECJ never fails to affirm the non-binding nature of the Commission's proposal for the computation of financial sanctions. Though essentially non-binding, they provide a useful point of reference. XXXIII A joint analysis of both the case law and the Commission's communications reveals a significant amount of mutual accommodation and crossfertilization.
Penalty payment
When the Court imposes a penalty payment, the three criteria of duration, seriousness and ability to pay form a recurring pattern. In older cases, the Court explained in detail how it treated the Commission's proposal: when it raised the proposed coefficient of duration or seriousness, XXXIV when it lowered them, XXXV or when it maintained them. XXXVI In more recent cases, however, the Court no longer argues on the basis of the Commission's proposal, but develops an autonomous assessment on the three criteria. This tendency is deplorable from our vantage point, since transparency in the computation of the sanctions is precisely what enables national mechanisms to adequately divide the responsibility among the governmental levels concerned. XXXVII The quasi-mathematical formula from the Communication becomes reduced to a complex balancing act. The Court takes up several arguments it deems relevant and 'weighs' them.
When assessing the coefficient of duration, the ECJ turns first to an abstract opinion. XXXVIII Next to this general finding, the Court also considers the character of the infraction, the difficulty to complete the implementation, and the measures already taken by the Member State. XXXIX For an assessment of the seriousness, the Court seems to operate along the same lines by first seeking out the "importance" of the infringed obligation. For instance, breaches in the fields of human health, the environment or state aid, are considered quite serious. XL This abstract form of scrutiny is combined with or exchanged for an in concreto assessment: the Court will inquire into the extent of the 
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infraction and what measures the Member State has adopted meanwhile to alleviate the infringement.
XLI
Finally, when the Court turns to the third criterion, the Member State's ability to pay, it invariably follows the Commission's calculation of the "n"-factor. The only digression found in the case law concerns the application of a recent update due to inflation and changes in the GDP of the Member State, XLII or the application of mitigating circumstances because of the financial crisis.
XLIII

The lump sum
The Court draws upon the following determinants: the duration since the first judgment declaring the infringement, the seriousness of the breach and the attitude of the Member State. On the duration, the ECJ does not limit itself to a mechanical multiplication based on the number of days, but often it seeks out mitigating or aggravating circumstances that explain the Member States' posture in that period. The same considerations explained above, when assessing the duration with respect to the penalty payment, resurface: the character of the breach, the difficulty to achieve full compliance, and the interim measures adopted. XLIV The Court does not subscribe to the Commission's proposition that duration should only be taken into account when computing the penalty payment. XLV This is regrettable, since it would partially alleviate some of the concerns following the cumulative imposition of the sanctions.
XLVI
The Court's treatment of the criterion of seriousness runs likewise largely parallel.
Thus, the ECJ indicates which subject matter it deems to be of high importance, XLVII and it reviews the behavior of the Member State in the past. 
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The considerations employed by the Court to compute the two types of sanctions are significantly intertwined, as exemplified by the multiple internal citations in a decision.
LI
This finding detracts from the transparency and coherence of the computation of both types of sanctions. In particular, with respect to multi-tiered Member States, the following problems cannot be answered by recourse to the ECJ's decision. A question that springs to mind concerns the responsibility of regions that do not -or no longer -partake in the breach at the stage of the second judgment under article 260 (2) TFEU but nevertheless have an influence on the computation of the sanctions, for instance because of a past implementation record. The next section will address in more depth the two leading cases where 'regional infringements' gave rise to a financial penalty.
Composition of sanctions in case of regional involvement
Cases C-610/10 and C-533/11 are of specific importance to the research question proposed. In both cases, the national government was not directly involved in the conduct under scrutiny. In the Spanish case, the Commission filed suit under article 260(2) TFEU because Spain had failed to recover illegal state aid from a company, even after a declaration of infringement. LII The next section will look in more depth at the national mechanisms that ensure compliance with EU law and how the regional point of view is incorporated into the infringement proceedings. Lastly, we will analyse the different mechanisms that divide financial sanctions under article 260 TFEU between the responsible governmental layers.
3. National mechanisms in Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Italy and the UK Austria, Germany, Belgium, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Spain are being selected for study since regional bodies with legislative powers feature -to varying degree -in their constitutional system. 'Tiered' MS is our connotation comprising both federal and regional states.
The particular mechanisms surrounding the implementation of EU law in the selected multi-tiered Member States show different traits, inspired by the overall logic of the balance between the governmental layers. We will review these mechanisms with the following questions in mind: firstly, is there a supervisory role for the national government These questions connect the enforcement mechanisms with the responsibility to implement EU law. Referring to the figures above in [table 1 ], the discrepancies between countries with a higher degree of regionalization, but a relatively low amount of infringement cases, can be explained due to a better functioning monitoring system or better intergovernmental cooperation. This is an important finding, considering the obligation of Member States to put optimal mechanisms in place in order to optimize the implementation and enforcement of EU law. LXVI We will revisit this point infra when discussing the national substitution mechanisms.
The national Member State as guarantor of EU obligations?
The six selected Member States, where differing degrees of regionalization play, seem to have a common trait with respect to compliance with EU law. From a cooperative system, like Germany, to a dual system, like Belgium, a provision allowing the national government to intervene or take control to ensure compliance following a (predetermined) breach of EU law, is installed.
In Belgium, this right to intervene is an anomaly given the dualistic set-up and the exclusive division of competences. The adage holds that for each individual case, a single entity, federal or regional, can be deemed competent on the matter, to the exclusion of others. LXVII One of the exceptions LXVIII is article 16 § 3 SAIR that allows the federal government to substitute itself for the regional government, responding to an international judgment and under the requirement of previous consultation with the subnational government concerned. When the article was devised in 1992, the travaux préparatoires explicitly referred to the infringement proceedings of article 258 and 260 TFEU. 
E -145
In the UK, the central and supervisory role of the Westminster government is hardly surprising. Not only does the division of competences rest on an intergovernmental agreement that is not susceptible to judicial review, LXXI 
Regional involvement in infringement proceedings
Every Member State under analysis has developed methods for cooperating in supranational litigation, thus giving regions an indirect voice at the EU level. The UK has a specific consultation mechanism on infringement proceedings, which allows a devolved region to take the lead when it concerns devolved matters. XCI In Spain, the right to intervene in infringement proceedings where an Autonomous Community is involved, is guaranteed through an intergovernmental agreement XCII signed in 1990. XCIII The mechanism is quite cooperative, requiring exchange of information in the administrative phase, and allowing for the regional government to submit observations to the Court through the national government (Chicharro Lázaro 2011: 205) . In Italy, a similar cooperation agreement between the State and the Regions has been adopted in 2008, with an emphasis on coordination and information exchange. XCIV Moreover, since 2012, the national government is required to send quarterly reports on pending inquiries and infringement proceedings to the House, and to the Regions. XCV In Belgium, the involvement of regions in infringement proceedings can take two routes: either through article 16 § 3 SAIR, which requires the federal government to consult with the region that has breached EU law. In practice, cooperation is achieved through the Interministerial Conference on Foreign Policy, and no recourse was ever made to the rights on consultation in article 16 SAIR.
When Germany is the subject of an infringement proceeding with a regional dimension, coordination of an agreement ('Einvernehmen') between the federal and the regional level is achieved through the Bundesrat. XCVI Note that, as opposed to Belgium, Spain and the UK, this is a collective mechanism (Panara & De Becker 2011: 340-341).
Partition of financial sanctions
The points of departure are the various national mechanisms for redress -for it is the national Member State that needs to pay the fine in the Commission's account. XCVII More often than not, the national partition of the financial sanctions will thus take the form of a right to redress. The general thrust of the mechanisms is to allocate the burden to whichever level that bears the responsibility for the infraction. We distinguish three strands. The first variant mitigates this burden by taking the budgetary capacity of the region into account, while the second allocates the amount in full to the region responsible.
The third strain tries to divide the sanctions with respect to the share in the infraction, and the size of the financial sanction.
Germany is a case in point to illustrate the first variant. In a rather rigid set-up, a mechanism for division of sanctions was set up, that allocates the burden to the party responsible, and minimizes ad hoc any disagreement. As well as being a rigid system, it is the most detailed of all mechanisms covered. Spain has set up a system in the third category. Each governmental level should take up its responsibility in case of a fine. This responsibility will be determined by the national government, after consultation with the regional executives. CX Important to note is that the federal government is obliged to take all the relevant criteria as deployed by the ECJ into consideration when deciding on the responsibility. CXI Supra, in section 2.3 we highlighted the discrepancy between the composition of the fine and the responsibility of the region in the final judgment, for example as displayed in the computation of the capability to bear 
Synthesis in propositions
The previous sections have dealt with the problem of regional liability under article 260 TFEU from both the national (C) and the European vantage point (B). It results that both are not perfectly aligned. We offer three propositions to improve this misfit.
Proposition 1: A more facilitative posture of the Commission and the European Court
The finding above that the method of computation of the financial sanctions under article 260 TFEU is rather opaque, renders the application of a system of internal partition in multi-tiered Member States even more problematic. The responsibility of each actor has to derive unambiguously from the reasoning of the Court, with respect to both the penalty payment and the lump sum. Indeed, the national Member State is solely responsible before the Court for the compliance with EU law.
CXXI In other words, the allocation of internal responsibility for the financial sanctions is, from the perspective of the EU, "your problem, not mine" to put it in vulgar terms. This explains the summary rejection of Spain's argument on the ability to pay of the Basque region. CXXII In another -more recent -case, the ECJ even explicitly rejected the question from Spain to be more precise in order to allow for an internal allocation mechanism to function.
"The Kingdom of Spain claims that the Court is required to state, for each of the contested decisions, the sums which have not yet been recovered, since that Member State is obliged, by virtue of its domestic law, to pass on the penalties imposed by the Court to the infra-State entities responsible for the infringement of EU law.
In that regard, it must be pointed out that the allocation of internal central and A second problem is of a more practical nature and relates to the necessary expertise and administrative capacity to implement directives in a given field. In the Belgian case, due to the exclusive division of competences, this necessary administrative expertise may be lacking to properly intervene, albeit temporarily. This may be solved by having recourse to the measures enacted by the other regional bodies, and extending them.
To sum up, the characteristics of a well-designed national mechanism are threefold: a)
there exists a possibility for a concurrent exercise of powers by allowing a temporal intervention by the national government; b) the division of the financial sanctions is as lucidly set out as possible; c) the national mechanism takes due account of the 
Conclusions
We set out to inquire how federal concerns and interests can be mitigated in the context of infringement procedures and financial sanctions under art. 260 TFEU. This article has analysed this question both from the perspective and practice of the Commission and the Court of Justice, as well as from the vantage point of the central and regional governments involved.
A careful analysis of the composition of financial sanctions has shown that regional responsibility and autonomy fits uneasily into current practice. From the perspective of EU law, the principle of equality, and responsibility, of the Member States precludes any direct imposition of sanctions. Even in the calculation, as we have seen in section B.III, the regional dimension is hardly taken into account.
We have turned to the various national mechanisms of redress to assign the internal responsibility for the financial sanctions under article 260 TFEU. In the six cases we have selected (Austria, Germany, Belgium, UK, Spain and Italy), different national mechanisms have been set up. It appears that these mechanisms are to a large extent untested, and leave large scope for political negotiation. Additionally, in these MS, regions often cannot access the infringement proceedings.
In conclusion, the Lisbon-fuelled enhancements of the article 260 TFEU procedures call for due attention to the structural dimension of several Member States. Timely implementation and compliance are the primordial objective. Failing that, a well-designed national mechanism to divide the sanctions at the national plane (5): "The Laender are bound to take measures which within their autonomous sphere of competence become necessary for the implementation of juridical acts within the framework of European integration; should a Land fail to comply punctually with this obligation and this be established against Austria by a court within the framework of European Union, the competence for such measures, in particular the issuance of the necessary laws, passes to the Federation. A measure taken by the Federation pursuant to this provision, in particular the issue of such a law or the issue of such an ordinance, becomes invalid as soon as the Land has taken the requisite action." LXXXII 8, 1993, II.3: "[…] que la plena garantía del cumplimiento y ejecución de las obligaciones internacionales y, en particular ahora, del Derecho Comunitario que al Estado encomienda el art. 93 C.E., a pesar de que necesariamente ha de dotar al Gobierno de la Nación de los instrumentos necesarios para desempeñar esa función garantista, articulándose la cláusula de responsabilidad por medio de una serie de poderes que permitan al Estado llevar a la práctica los compromisos internacionales adoptados, tampoco puede tener una incidencia o proyección interna que venga a alterar la distribución de poderes entre el Estado y las Comunidades Autónomas operada por el bloque de la constitucionalidad. Y es que, aun cuando en el art. 93 C.E. se localiza una clara manifestación del monopolio competencial del Estado en orden a la garantía del cumplimiento de los compromisos adquiridos frente a otros sujetos de Derecho internacional, ya que esa garantía de la ejecución -no, desde luego, la ejecución misma-sí puede integrarse en el contenido del art. CXXXIV Commission v Italy (note CXXXII) para 22: "La République italienne, dans le mémoire qu'elle a présenté à la Cour, se borne à lui transmettre les arguments de la région de Ligurie en les reproduisant textuellement, mais sans les reprendre à son compte. La République italienne ne présente en outre pas de conclusions tendant au rejet du recours de la Commission ni même à la condamnation de cette dernière aux dépens. De plus, la République italienne a fait savoir à la Cour, dans le cadre de la procédure de référé, qu'elle partageait l'analyse de la Commission et qu'elle a introduit, devant la Corte costituzionale (Cour constitutionnelle), un recours contestant la constitutionnalité de la loi régionale n° 34/2001 sur les mêmes fondements que le présent recours en manquement." CXXXV On this balance, see Lenaerts & Cambien 2010: 634 . CXXXVI Commission v. France (note XXXVI) para 80: "The procedure laid down in Article 228(2) EC has the objective of inducing a defaulting Member State to comply with a judgment establishing a breach of obligations and thereby of ensuring that Community law is in fact applied. The measures provided for by that provision, namely a lump sum and a penalty payment, are both intended to achieve this objective". CXXXVII See the references in note LXVI and accompanying text. CXXXVIII In the Italian case, the combination of a substitution mechanism and a right to full redress has led Bertolino to criticize the amount of the redress, arguing that the national government bears some responsibility: see 
